A Bridge Too Far?: The Need for a Hard Look at South Carolina\u27s New Coastal Island Regulations by Harper, John P., III
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 58 




A Bridge Too Far?: The Need for a Hard Look at South Carolina's 
New Coastal Island Regulations 
John P. Harper III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
John P. Harper III, A Bridge Too Far?: The Need for a Hard Look at South Carolina's New Coastal Island 
Regulations, 58 S. C. L. Rev. 455 (2007). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
A BRIDGE Too FAR? THE NEED FOR A HARD LOOK
AT SOUTH CAROLINA'S NEW COASTAL ISLAND REGULATIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2005, the South Carolina Supreme Court invalidated a state regulation
regarding the granting of permits to construct bridges to small marsh islands in
South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. South Carolina Department of
Health and Environmental Control.' While the regulation expressly applied to
"access to small marsh islands," the court found it was void due to vagueness
because it failed to define what constituted a small island.' As a result, the court
held the general transportation regulations that are part of the coastal regulatory
schemes for tideland and coastal projects3 governed the bridge construction
permitting process.4
In response to the invalidation of the access-to-small-islands regulations
(small island regulations), the South Carolina Department of Health and
Environmental Control (DHEC), through its Office of Ocean and Coastal
Resource Management (OCRM), promulgated new regulations. At the direction
of the DHEC Board, OCRM created an advisory stakeholder committee 5
composed of interested parties to develop a new permitting process for bridge
construction to coastal islands.6 While the South Carolina General Assembly
approved only a portion of the recommended regulations,7 the new regulations
for access to coastal islands (coastal island regulations) represent a complete
reworking of the bridge permitting process rather than simply the inclusion of a
definition for small islands. Where the old small island regulations listed eleven
factors for determining if OCRM should issue a permit to construct a bridge to
"a small island,"' the new coastal island regulations set bright-line size and
distance limitations.9
Thus, the potential ramifications of the new coastal island regulations are far
reaching. The coastal island regulations restrict the number of islands eligible to
apply for bridge construction permits, limiting the number of coastal islands that
1. 363 S.C. 67, 75, 610 S.E.2d 482 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N) (Supp. 2004),
invalidated by S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, 363 S.C.
at 75, 610 S.E.2d at 486.
2. S.C. Coastal Conservation League, 363 S.C. at 75, 610 S.E.2d at 486.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(F) (Supp. 2004).
4. S.C. Coastal Conservation League, 363 S.C. at 75, 610 S.E.2d at 486.
5. Statement of Situation Requiring Immediate Promulgation of Regulatory Amendments
Regarding Access to Coastal Islands, 29 S.C. Reg. 104, 105 (Oct. 28, 2005).
6. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N) (2006).
7. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N) (Supp. 2006); see also 30 S.C. Reg. 167 (June 23, 2006).
8. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N) (Supp. 2004).
9. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2) (Supp. 2006).
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can be developed in the future.' ° Thus, members of the environmental
community worry that the regulations are arbitrary and fail to provide adequate
protection to some ecologically sensitive areas."
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v.
South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. Part III
reviews the small island regulations invalidated in S.C. Coastal Conservation
League and describes the new coastal island regulations. Part IV outlines the
historical development and benefits of aggressive judicial review of agency
decision-making under the hard look doctrine. This part argues that South
Carolina courts should adopt a similar standard of review. Finally, Part V
analyzes the creation and implementation of the coastal island regulations
through the lens of the hard look doctrine and concludes that a court applying
hard look review would determine that the coastal islands regulations should be
remanded to DHEC because they were not the result of reasoned decision-
making based on all relevant facts, but instead represent an arbitrary and
capricious rule formulated with inadequate information. Part VI concludes.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN
S. C. COASTAL CONSERVATION LEAGUE
In S.C. Coastal Conservation League, LandTech, a Charleston corporation,
applied to OCRM for a permit to construct a bridge across the Wando River
marshes.' LandTech wanted to construct the bridge across the marshes as part
of its development plan for Park Island. 3 After reviewing the application,
OCRM determined that Park Island was a small island and that the permit
application must be analyzed under the small island regulations. 4 LandTech
disagreed with OCRM's determination that Park Island was a small island and
argued the more general transportation regulations should apply to the
permitting process. 5 Although OCRM disagreed that the transportation
regulations should apply to the Park Island bridge permit, OCRM determined
that the permit application met the criteria of the more stringent small island
regulations and granted a bridge construction permit to LandTech. 6
10. See infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text; see also E-mail from James S. Chandler, Jr.,
S.C. Envtl. Law Project, to Carolyn Boltin, Deputy Comm'r of the S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl.
Control, Office of Coastal Res. Mgmt. (April 4,2006,2:01:24 PM EST) (stating that, without including
"performance standards," the regulations do not adequately minimize environmental impacts of island
development).
12. S.C. Coastal Conservation League v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control 363 S.C. 67, 70,
610 S.E.2d 482, 484 (2005).
13. See id.
14. Id. at 70-71,610 S.E.2d at 484.
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The South Carolina Coastal Conservation League (Coastal Conservation
League) objected to OCRM granting the permit and appealed the decision before
the Administrative Law Judge Division (ALJD). 17 The Coastal Conservation
League, while agreeing with OCRM that the small island regulations applied to
LandTech's permit application, argued that LandTech's application did not
satisfy the regulatory criteria in the small island regulations. Therefore, the
Coastal Conservation League argued that OCRM improperly granted the Park
Island permit.1 8 Throughout these proceedings, LandTech continued to object to
the OCRM determination that Park Island was a small island.' 9
In the subsequent administrative hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
agreed with LandTech and held that the transportation regulations were the
appropriate set of rules for evaluating the Park Island permit application. z
During the proceedings, the ALJ noted that the regulations failed to define
"small island" and that OCRM needed specific criteria in order to objectively
determine when the small island regulations applied.2 ' In an effort to create
objective criteria, the ALJ compared the size of Park Island with other islands in
the Wando River Basin. 2 The ALJ did not, however, consider the size of Park
Island in relation to other islands in different river basins. 23 The comparison led
the ALJ to determine that Park Island was not a small island because it was
larger than 80% of the islands in the Wando River Basin.24 As a result, the ALJ
held the general transportation regulations applied to the Park Island bridge
construction permit.
Despite finding that Park Island was not a small island, the ALJ reviewed
the OCRM determination that the permit conformed to the small island
regulations.26 The ALJ found that, even if Park Island qualified as a small island,
all eleven factors contained in the Small Island Regulations pointed to granting
the permit. Under either regulation, therefore, OCRM properly granted the
bridge construction permit.
27
The Coastal Conservation League appealed the ALJ's determination to the
OCRM Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel 28 which affirmed the
17. Id. While the Coastal Conservation League was not a real party in interest because it did not
have a personal stake in the Park Island bridge permit application, courts may grant environmental
groups standing to challenge agency determinations when the group asserts a recognizable injury to the
interest of its members. S.C. Wildlife Fed'n v. S.C. Coastal Council, 296 S.C. 187, 190, 371 S.E.2d 521,
523 (1988).










28. The Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel is created by statute and is charged with
advising DHEC. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-40 (Supp. 2006).
2007]
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decision of the ALJ without analysis.29 On appeal of the panel's decision, the
circuit court overturned the ALJ determination that Park Island was a small
island, finding the ALJ erroneously used a test that was not established by
regulation.30 In the absence of objective criteria, the circuit court deferred to the
OCRM determination that Park Island was a small island.3 In addition, the
circuit court overturned the ALJ's determination that the issuance of the permit
was proper, finding that the issuance of the permit did not conform to the more
stringent criteria set forth in the small island regulations.32 As a result, the circuit
court vacated the granting of the Park Island permit, prompting LandTech to
appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court.33
On appeal, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that the small island
regulations were void due to vagueness because they expressly apply to small
islands but fail to promulgate a "test to determine whether an island is small. 34
The court also determined that in the absence of any particularized regulation,
the more general transportation regulations applied to LandTech's Park Island
permit application. The court held that because OCRM was the sole
administrative entity with rule making power and OCRM did not include a test
in the regulations, the test used by the ALJ was improper.35 Similarly, the court
held the circuit court's decision deferring to OCRM was improper because the
regulation impermissibly granted unguided discretion to OCRM in determining
when the small island regulations applied.36 The court ruled that, in such cases,
the appropriate action is to "defer to the relevant administrative agency's
decisions with respect to its own regulations unless there is a compelling reason
to differ."37 The court, therefore, deferred to the decision resulting from the
OCRM adjudication by the Coastal Zone Management Appellate Panel. 38 The
court found "no compelling reason to overrule the panel's decision" that Park
Island was not a small island and that the transportation regulations applied to
29. SC. Coastal Conservation League, 363 S.C. at 71-72, 610 S.E.2d at 484.
30. Id. at 72, 610 S.E.2d at 484.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 72, 610 S.E.2d at 485.
34. Id. at 75, 610 S.E.2d at 486.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 74-75, 610 S.E.2d at 486.
37. Id. at 75,610 S.E.2d at 486 (citing Brown v. S.C. State Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 348
S.C. 507,515,560 S.E.2d410, 414 (2002); Byerly Hosp. v. Health and Human Serv. Fin. Cornm'n, 319
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LandTech's permit application.39 LandTech began construction of the bridge on
August 1, 2005.40
III. THE REGULATIONS
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) is the enabling legislation that
gives DHEC, and thus OCRM, authority to regulate development of the South
Carolina coast.4' The purpose of the CZMA "is to protect the quality of the
coastal environment and to promote the economic and social improvement of the
coastal zone and all of the people of the State." '42 The CZMA requires that any
person desiring to erect a structure within a critical area must first obtain a
permit from DHEC.43 The state can require a permit for bridge construction over
tidelands because, based on the public trust doctrine, the state holds presumptive
title to all land below the mean high tide line.44 Therefore, any party desiring to
build a private bridge to an island must obtain the state's permission because,
absent a showing otherwise,45 the state owns title, for the benefit of the public, to
the land through or over which the bridge must be built.4"
39. Id. The court held that the Coastal Conservation League never raised the issue of whether the
permit met the less stringent transportation regulations in the lower courts but only argued that the small
island regulations should apply to the Park Island permitting process. id. at 76, 610 S.E.2d at 487. The
law of the case, therefore, was that the permit complied with the transportation regulations. Id. The court
noted, however, that if it had reached the question of whether the permit comported to the transportation
regulations, substantial evidence existed to support the appellate panel's finding that LandTech met the
permit requirements. Id.
40. See http://www.landtechsc.com/parkisland.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2007). This website
indicates that the construction of the bridge is complete. Id.
41. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-50 (1987 & Supp. 2006).
42. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-30(A) (1987 & Supp. 2006); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10(B)
(1987 & Supp. 2006) (naming Beaufort, Berkeley, Charleston, Colleton, Dorchester, Georgetown,
Horry, and Jasper counties as comprising the coastal zone).
43. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-130(C) (2003); see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 (2003) (defining
critical area as either coastal waters, tidelands, beaches, or certain beach/dune areas).
44. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 149, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (2003); State v.
Yelsen Land Co., 265 S.C. 78, 81, 216 S.E.2d 876, 878 (1975) (applying the public trust doctrine to
tidelands); Kenneth R. Moss, The Public Trust Doctrine in South Carolina, 7 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 31
(1998); see also 2003 S.C. Op. Att'y Gen., 2003 WL 22970990 (Dec. 5, 2003) (stating that the state
holds presumptive title to marsh islands even though they are above the mean high tide line).
45. A property owner can overcome the presumptive title held by the state with a showing of clear
title granted from the sovereign-a King's Grant or Legislative Grant-which is strictly construed
against the grantee. McQueen, 354 S.C. at 149 n.6, 580 S.E.2d at 119 n.6 (citing Hobonny Club, Inc.
v. McEachern, 272 S.C. 392, 396, 252 S.E.2d 133, 135 (1979)).
46. See McQueen, 354 S.C. at 149, 580 S.E.2d at 119; State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 543, 193
S.E.2d 497, 501 (1972); Rice Hope Plantation v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 216 S.C. 500, 529, 59 S.E.2d
132, 144 (1950), overruled on other grounds by McCall v. Batson, 285 S.C. 243, 246-47,329 S.E.2d
741, 742-43 (1985) (abolishing the doctrine of sovereign immunity and overruling all cases in which
the court upheld the doctrine); State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 84 (1884).
5
Harper: A Bridge Too Far?: The Need for a Hard Look at South Carolina's N
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
A. The Old Small Island Regulations
OCRM promulgated the small island regulations 47 and the general
transportation regulations 48 for building permits in coastal and tidewater areas.
Based on the values set forth in the CZMA,49 the purpose of the small island
regulations was to protect critical areas, which included tidelands,50 by
developing more stringent criteria for building bridges to small marsh islands.5
The first step in determining whether to grant a bridge permit was for OCRM to
determine if the small island regulations or the general transportation regulations
applied to the island for which the applicant sought a bridge permit.52 If OCRM
determined that the small island regulations were applicable, the agency then
used the eleven factors outlined in the regulation to determine whether it was
appropriate to grant the permit for constructing the bridge.53 The factors included
size of the island, public need, impact to potential resources, existence of
feasible alternatives, and the distance, type, and dimensions of bridging
required.54 OCRM, therefore, weighed a number of social, economic, and
environmental factors and competing interests in determining whether bridging
to a small island was appropriate.
B. The New Coastal Island Regulations
The new coastal island regulations, promulgated by OCRM to replace the
old small island regulations, apply to "applications for permits for bridges and
docks as a means of obtaining access to coastal islands."55 The intent of the
regulations is to protect "important habitats and resources associated with
islands"56 from damage caused by "the placement of structures into critical area
coastal tidelands and waters."57 The new coastal island regulations identify
"[c]onstruction of bridges within critical area tidelands and water" as causing
"temporary damage to salt marsh and shellfish beds, temporary increased
turbidity, permanent displacement of marshes by installation of pilings, and
permanent shading of marsh."58
47. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N) (Supp. 2004), invalidated by S.C. Coastal Conservation
League v. S.C. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 363 S.C. 67, 75, 610 S.E.2d 482, 486 (2005).
48. S.C. CODE ANN. REGs. 30-12(J) (Supp. 2004).
49. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-20(E), -30 (1987 & Supp. 2006).
50. S.C. CODE ANN § 48-39-10(J) (1987 & Supp. 2006).
51. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N) (Supp. 2004).
52. S.C. Coastal Conservation League, 363 S.C. at 74, 610 S.E.2d at 486.
53. Id.
54. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N) (Supp. 2004).
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One major difference between the two sets of regulations is that the new
coastal island regulations define when an island is eligible for a bridge permit. 9
Under the old small island regulations, OCRM reviewed each permit application
by weighing the eleven factors listed in the regulation. In contrast, the new
coastal island regulations clearly define which islands are eligible for a permit.
The new coastal island regulations prohibit OCRM from considering any
application for a bridge construction permit to access an island less than two
acres in size6" unless the island is larger than one acre and no more than one
hundred feet from the upland.6 For islands two acres or larger, the maximum
allowed bridge length correlates to the island's size-the larger the island, the
longer the maximum allowable length of the bridge.62 The coastal island
regulations limit the maximum length of any bridge to 1,500 feet.63 As a result,
any coastal island greater than 1,500 feet from the upland is ineligible for a
bridge construction permit.64 Islands one acre or larger that are otherwise
ineligible for a permit65 may qualify for a special exception that requires "clear
and convincing evidence that [the bridge] will create overriding public benefits
resulting from mitigation and diminished impacts to public trust resources
compared with development that would likely occur without the bridge. 66
At the time the new coastal island regulations were enacted, they covered
2,409 islands without bridges in South Carolina.67 Under the new regulations,
only 186, or 7.7%, of undeveloped islands are eligible for bridge permits. 68 This
number is a drastic reduction; under the old small island regulations every island
was subject to potential bridging and development.69
59. Id. 30-12(N)(2).
60. Id. 30-12(N)(2)(c).
61. Id. 30-12(N)(2)(e). The regulations define upland as the naturally occurring mainland. Id. 30-
12(N)(2)(f)(i)(a). For the purposes of this regulation, the following islands are also considered uplands:
Waites Island, Pawleys Island, Isle of Palms, Sullivan's Island, Folly Island, Kiawah Island, Seabrook
Island, Edisto Island, Johns Island, James Island, Woodville Island, Slann Island, Wadmalaw Island,
Daniel Island, Edisto Beach, Harbor Island, Hunting Island, Fripp Island, Hilton Head Island, St. Helena




65. In addition to the islands that fail the regulatory criteria for eligibility, islands within the ACE
Basin Task Force Boundary Area, the North Inlet National Estuarine Research Reserve, and the Cape
Romain National Wildlife Refuge are not eligible to apply for a bridge permit. Id. 30-12(N)(2)(b).
However, OCRM can issue permits in these areas under a strict exception. Id 30-12(N)(2)(b).
66. Id. 30-12(N)(10).
67. Office Of Coastal Res. Mgmt., S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control, Coastal Island Size and
Distance Matrix (on file with the OCRM-Charleston Office).
68. Id.
69. Id. Another striking difference between the two regulations is that the new coastal island
regulations can compel the dedication of a conservation easement on an island to reduce any
environmental impact caused by the construction of a bridge. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(4)
(Supp. 2006). For a discussion of conservation easements in South Carolina, see Legislative Note, South
Carolina Solid Waste Policy and Management Act of 1991, 1 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 69 (1991).
2007]
7
Harper: A Bridge Too Far?: The Need for a Hard Look at South Carolina's N
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
IV. SOUTH CAROLINA'S CURRENT STANDARD OF REVIEW AND THE HARD LOOK
DOCTRINE
A. The Current Standard of Review for Administrative Decisions in South
Carolina
South Carolina courts use a deferential approach when reviewing
administrative rulemaking. The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that
"[a]n administrative regulation is valid as long as it is reasonably related to the
purpose of the enabling legislation" 70 and does not exceed the agency's
authority. 7' In assessing the validity of legislative enactments, South Carolina
courts afford legislative enactments great deference.7 Under this standard of
review, a legislative enactment is valid so long as it "bears a reasonable
relationship to a legitimate state interest. '73 Therefore, the standards of review
for administrative regulations and legislative enactments are virtually identical.
The court, however, should not afford administrative rulemaking the same
deference afforded to legislative enactments. Courts should afford legislative
enactments great deference because they are the result of a democratically
elected body charged with making decisions that affect the public health, safety,
and welfare. 74 Administrative decisions deserve less deference than legislative
70. Hunter & Walden Co. v. S.C. State Licensing Bd. for Contractors, 272 S.C. 211, 213, 251
S.E.2d 186, 186-87 (1978) (citing Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973)
(upholding a regulation requiring a contractor to demonstrate $50,000 net worth for licensure as
reasonably related to the statutory provision requiring contractors to submit a financial statement for
licensure)); see also McNickel's, Inc. v. S.C. Dept. of Revenue, 331 S.C. 629,634-35,503 S.E.2d 723,
725-26 (1998) (upholding a video poker regulation requiring employee presence for an entity to comply
with the statutory limitation on the number of machines in a single place because the regulation was
reasonably related to the determination of whether conjoined, but separate businesses constituted
separate places); U.S. Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 324 S.C. 1, 3,481 S.E.2d 112,
113-14 (1997) (upholding a highway advertising regulation requiring a business to be "readily
recognized" as a business and not simply "visible" as specified by statute because the regulation was
reasonably related to the purpose of the statute and the legislature specifically authorized the agency
to specify a more restrictive definition); Anco, Inc. v. State Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm'n, 300
S.C. 432, 443, 388 S.E.2d 780, 787 (1989) (upholding a Medicaid policy that reduced reimbursement
of lease costs to providers because the policy was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose
in that the reduction in reimbursement allowed more money for patient services); Milliken & Co. v. S.C.
Dept. of Labor, Div. of Occupational Safety & Health, 275 S.C. 264, 267, 269 S.E.2d 763, 764 (1980)
(invalidating an administrative rule that permitted post-citation discovery where the authorizing statute
contemplated the completion of fact-finding prior to the issuance of a citation).
71. Milliken, 275 S.C. at 268, 269 S.E.2d at 765 (invalidating the decision of the Commissioner
of Labor to promulgate a rule allowing for post-citation discovery because the authorizing statute did
not allow for such a regulation).
72. See Duke Power Co. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 284 S.C. 81, 93-94, 326 S.E.2d 395, 402
(1985) (quoting Bauer v. S.C. State Housing Auth., 271 S.C. 219, 235-37, 246 S.E.2d 869, 877-78
(1978)).
73. Id.
74. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) (applying rational basis review
and stating that "even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and
... judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political
[Vol. 58: 455
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enactments because agency decisions emanate from an unelected group that is
not as directly accountable to the public. 75 South Carolina courts, therefore,
should abandon the current deferential standard and should undertake a more
aggressive judicial review of administrative regulations by applying the hard
look doctrine.
B. An Overview of the Hard Look Doctrine
The purpose of the hard look doctrine is to ensure that agencies engage in
reasoned decision-making by gathering the necessary information.76 While
courts using the hard look doctrine still give some deference to agency
decisions, to determine if the rulemaking is supported by the appropriate amount
of evidence, courts also delve into the facts and evidence established in the
record on which the agency relied in making its decision.77 Under a traditional
rational basis review, "legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained.
• . if rationally related to a legitimate state interest. ' '78 The court gives such wide
deference to the legislature because it presumes that "even improvident
decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process., 79 Under the
hard look doctrine, the court is essentially giving rational basis more teeth by not
accepting an agency finding at face value. 0 In determining whether an agency's
decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, a court applying
branch has acted.") (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).
75. Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference,
58 ADM[N. L. REV. 429,443 2006) (arguing that independent agencies should be afforded less deference
than executive branch agencies because of their limited political accountability). Under South Carolina
law, the General Assembly must approve administrative regulations. S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-120
(2005). Considerable differences exist, however, in how the General Assembly enacts statutes compared
to how it approves regulations. When enacting a statute, the General Assembly studies and debates the
provision in a way that is open and amenable to public scrutiny. Furthermore, state legislators are
directly accountable to their constituents for their legislative actions. In contrast, agency staff often
studies and debates regulations outside the view of the general public and is not held directly
accountable to the public.
76. JAMES T. O'REILLY, ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING: STRUCTURING, OPPOSING, AND
DEFENDING FEDERAL AGENCY REGULATIONS § 15.04, at 295 (1983 & Supp. 2006) (citing James V.
DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration ofLaw and Policy, 65 VA. L. REV. 257, 354 (1979);
Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509,
511 (1974)).
77. Id
78. City of Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (citations omitted).
79. Id
80. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997) (noting that findings of Congress
are due more deference than findings of administrative agencies because Congress is "far better
equipped than the judiciary to amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data" used to make legislative
decisions) (citing Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-66, 670 (1994) (plurality opinion)).
2007]
9
Harper: A Bridge Too Far?: The Need for a Hard Look at South Carolina's N
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58: 455
hard look review looks to the record established and used by the agency to make
its decision.8'
The hard look doctrine traces its roots to decisions from the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. 2 In the first phase of the development of
the doctrine, courts used it to assess whether an agency had gathered sufficient
information upon which to make an informed decision.83 In the second phase of
the development of the doctrine, courts began to "carefully scrutinize agency
decisions with the same hard look focus. 8 4 Courts extended the hard look
doctrine beyond requiring that agencies take a hard look at available information
to avoid arbitrary and capricious decisions but now look at how agencies used
that information to make decisions." Under the current doctrine, therefore, an
agency cannot simply show it took a hard look at all of the relevant information
but must also show it used the relevant information in developing its position.
The hard look doctrine quickly spread from the D.C. Circuit to other federal
circuits.8 6 The Supreme Court used the notion of a hard look at agency decision-
making in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe.87 In Volpe, the Court
held that a district court may conduct a searching inquiry to determine if
substantial evidence supported an agency decision.88 The Court noted that, while
the agency is due deference in its decision, the court must determine that the
agency decision "was not 'arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion."'8 9 In
81. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); O'RELLY,
supra note 76, at 295-96 n.3; see, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851
(D.C. Cir. 1970) ("If satisfied that the agency has taken a hard look at the issues with the use of reasons
and standards, the court will uphold its findings, though of less than ideal clarity, if the agency's path
may reasonably be discerned, though of course the court must not be left to guess as to the agency's
findings or reasons." (footnote omitted)). The hard look doctrine is well-suited for assessing agency
decisions in the context of environmental rulemaking because of the amount of scientific information
involved. See Leventhal, supra note 76, at 511-12.
82. O'RIELLY, supra note 76, at 296 (citations omitted).
83. Id.; see, e.g., Pikes Peak Broad. Co. v. FCC, 422 F.2d 671, 682 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (refusing to
remand for further fact finding after being "satisfied that the Commission gave petitioners' predictions
a hard look"); Greater Boston Television Corp., 444 F.2d at 851 (requiring that an "agency articulate
with reasonable clarity its reasons for decision, and identify the significance of the crucial facts" and
stating that "[t]he function of the court is to assure that the agency has given reasoned consideration to
all the material facts and issues" (citations omitted)).
84. O'REILLY, supra note 76, at 296 (citing Md.-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 487 F.2d 1029, 1037-38 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
85. Id.; see Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375,402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (requiring
that EPA use data in such a way as to result in reasoned decision-making).
86. O'REILLY, supra note 76, at 297 (citing Adler v. Lewis, 675 F.2d 1085, 1098 (9th Cir. 1982);
Town of Brookline v. Gorsuch, 667 F.2d 215, 220 (1st Cir. 1981); Benmar Transp. & Leasing Corp.
v. ICC, 623 F.2d 740, 745 (2d Cir. 1980); Nat'l Indus. Sand Ass'n v. Marshall, 601 F.2d 689, 699 (3d
Cir. 1979); Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831, 844 (5th Cir.
1978); Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025, 1063 (8th Cir. 1978)).
87. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
88. Id. at 415.
89. Id. at 416 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1964 ed., Supp. V)). The
Supreme Court also used the hard look doctrine, albeit without calling it such, in Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Ass 'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S.
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making this determination, the court looks to see if the agency based its decision
"on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error in judgment."90 For example, an agency rule that "entirely failed to
consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible
that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise" would fail judicial review under the hard look doctrine.9'
A number of state courts also apply some version of the hard look doctrine
to agency decisions. For example, when reviewing agency decisions, Alaska
courts examine whether "'the agency has taken a "hard look" at the salient
problems and has "genuinely engaged in reasoned decision making."' 9 ' In
addition, courts in New Jersey require that the administrative "record contains
substantial evidence to support" the agency's findings.93 In New Jersey, a party
can successfully challenge a regulation by showing that "the agency clearly
erred in reaching a conclusion that could not have reasonably been made based
on relevant factors., 94 Also, Washington courts find that an "agency action is
arbitrary and capricious if it is willful and unreasoning and taken without regard
to the attending facts or circumstances." 95 Therefore, while not invoking the hard
look doctrine by name, some state courts use a form of hard look review when
determining the validity of state regulations.
There are many benefits to a court system that applies the hard look doctrine
to agency rulemaking and decisions.96 The greatest benefit of the hard look
doctrine is that aggressive judicial review results in rules and actions that are the
result of reasoned decision-making by the agency.97 Agencies sometimes allow
their choices to be "essentially dictated by professional values rather than
science and without consideration of alternatives that reflect different values." 9t
The threat of aggressive judicial review can not only correct past unsubstantiated
29,42 (1983). In Motor Vehicle, the Court held that "an agency changing its course by rescindingarule
is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change." Id. at 42. Furthermore, this standard applied
whether the agency was rescinding its earlier position or acting in the first instance. Id. at 41.
90. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416 (citation omitted).
91. Motor Vehicle, 463 U.S. at 43.
92. Mech. Contractors of Alaska, Inc. v. State Dep't of Pub. Safety, 91 P.3d 240, 247 (Alaska
2004) (quoting Stepovak-Shumagin Set Net Ass'n v. State Bd. of Fisheries, 886 P.2d 632,637 (Alaska
1994)).
93. In re Adoption of the 2003 Low Income Housing Tax Credit Qualified Allocation Plan, 848
A.2d 1, 11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (citing George Harms Constr. Co. v. N.J. Tpk. Auth., 644
A.2d 76, 86 (N.J. 1994)).
94. Id.
95. Wash. Indep. Tel. Ass'n v. Wash. Utils. & Transp. Comm'n, 64 P.3d 606, 615 (Wash. 2003)
(citing Rios v. Wash. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 39 P.3d 961, 970 (Wash. 2002)).
96. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency
Action, 1989 DUKE L.J. 522 (1989).
97. Mark Seidenfeld, Reply, Hard Look Review in a World of Techno-Bureaucratic
Decisionmaking: A Reply to Professor McGarity, 75 TEX. L. REv. 559, 563-65 (1997) [hereinafter
Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review].
98. Id. at 564.
2007]
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decision-making by an agency but may also force agencies to "consider[]
whether alternative decisionmaking criteria might be appropriate." 99 The hard
look doctrine places pressure on an agency to gather the necessary information
before making a decision because failure to do so subjects the agency decision to
possible invalidation by the courts.' 0 The hard look doctrine, therefore, can lead
to an increase in reasoned decision-making by placing judicial pressure on an
agency to provide data to support its reasoning.
Another important benefit of the hard look doctrine is that it protects our
notion of separation of powers by providing a substantial and important check
on arbitrary agency action.' ' As the power of the "Fourth Branch" of
government continues to grow, it is important for courts to exercise their
constitutional duty as a check on arbitrary executive and legislative power.'0 2
Complicated political situations now existing in state legislatures give rise to
broad grants of administrative power. 3 Aggressive judicial review is necessary
to provide a check on possibly arbitrary agency decisions that may adversely
impact the community. 4 The hard look doctrine, therefore, can serve as a check
on the burgeoning power of the administrative state.
The hard look doctrine also serves to advance the perceived legality and
legitimacy of an agency decision." 5 The improvement in the "quality of both the
actual review and the perceived fairness of the appellate process"'0 6 leads the
public to view the agency action as a legitimate exercise of the administrative
state. 0 7 Without the perception of legality and legitimacy of an agency decision,
the administrative state loses the credibility it needs to function appropriately.
By subjecting agency decisions to aggressive judicial review, the hard look
doctrine provides the necessary credibility for the administrative state.
Finally, the hard look doctrine defends the interest and participation of the
general public in the decision-making process. 8 Scholars have viewed the hard
look doctrine as a "protector of increased citizen participation and deliberative
99. Id. at 565.
100. Sunstein, supra note 96, at 525.
101. Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify
Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REv. 483,489-90 (1997) [hereinafter
Seidenfeld, Deossification]; see William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and
Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 393, 403-04 (2000).
102. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement ofAdequate Reasonsfor Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J.
387,425 (1987).
103. See Thomas 0. Sargentich, The Critique of Active Judicial Review of Administrative
Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 599, 619-20 (1997).
104. See id. at 642-43.
105. See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 523, 525-526.
106. O'REILLY, supra note 76, at 297.
107. See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 525.
108. See Jordan, supra note 101, at 404.
466 [Vol. 58: 455
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government."' 9 The notice-and-comment rulemaking procedure that agencies
often use today relies on input from non-agency participants. " The problem of
agency capture"' can result from the disproportionate influence of special
interest groups over agency decision-making." 2 It is no surprise that organized
private interest groups have the resources to protect and advance their interests,
often at the expense of parties who lack the resources to effectively organize and
advance their position. 1 3 The hard look doctrine protects the interests of non-
organized interested parties by requiring that an agency base its decision on all
relevant information. 14
Despite its many benefits, critics of the hard look doctrine point to some
counterbalancing drawbacks." 5 In applying the doctrine, courts must conduct a
searching review of the administrative decision-making process. This aggressive
judicial review results in the court utilizing scarce judicial resources that it may
not otherwise consume through applying other methods of review." 6 Given the
benefits provided by aggressive judicial review, however, the additional judicial
resources expended by hard look review are well spent.
Another criticism of the hard look doctrine is that it can result in agency
freeze by creating uncertainty about whether a court would find the agency
determination is the result of reasoned decision-making." 7 Agency freeze results
from three types of uncertainty created by aggressive judicial review." 8 First, the
court's lack of understanding of the intricacies involved in setting highly
technical standards results in the court placing an emphasis on fairness to the
parties rather than on a long lasting and feasible solution to the problem faced by
the agency." 9 Unlike agency professionals, judges are not trained in specialized
technical fields and tend to view the decision-making process from the
perspective of legal experts.2 0 The result is that courts focus on possible agency
109. Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory
Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 Wis. L. REV. 763, 768 (1994).
110. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative
Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 182-89 (1997) (discussing the various benefits gained
from mass participation in agency rulemaking).
111. For further discussion of agency capture, see generally PAULJ. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE
IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES (1981) (detailing pressures on regulatory agencies to adopt pro-
industry policies) and KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1986) (showing how interest groups are designed to influence public policy).
112. See Sunstein, supra note 96, at 525.
113. See id at 184.
114. Lisa Shultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 528 n.313 (2003).
115. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Response, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A
Response to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REv. 525, 529-30 (1997).
116. See O'REILLY, supra note 76, at 297.
117. See Seidenfeld, Hard Look Review, supra note 97, at 492-99.
118. Id. at 492.
119. Id. at 492-93 (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 388 (1986)).
120. Id. at 493.
2007]
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abuses of power rather than the technical difficulties of solving a particular
problem.' 2 ' This results in agencies employing professionals from a broad range
of fields and spending additional time crafting rules that will hold up against
aggressive judicial review.'22
A second uncertainty introduced by the hard look doctrine results from the
requirement that an agency assess all relevant factors before making a
decision.'23 Courts have not articulated a standard that adequately guides an
agency in determining whether a factor is important enough to warrant
attention."' This results in ancillary issues either slowing down the agency
decision-making process or causing agencies to shy away from issuing
regulations. 125
A third uncertainty created by aggressive judicial scrutiny is how hard an
agency may be required to look at the relevant issues.2 6 The lack of any
objective criteria for agency analysis often results in agencies "performing costly
and time-consuming studies to support their rules.' ' 127 Also, an agency may elect
not to engage in rulemaking if gathering sufficient supporting information would
be too expensive or time consuming. 8
These potential costs of aggressive judicial review, however, do not
outweigh the benefits gained from having administrative agencies engage in
reasoned decision-making. The added expertise of additional professionals
providing input during the rulemaking process should result in the agency
crafting a better rule.'29 Furthermore, if an agency gathers more data concerning
an issue, it could lead to a more reasoned decision. While there is a tipping point
past which the agency only receives diminished returns, there is no evidence that
applying the hard look doctrine passes that point. 3 ° Weighing both the benefits
and the costs, "[j]udicial review under the hard look doctrine is the price we pay
for delegating highly complex important public policy decisions to unelected
administrative agencies."''
121. Id.
122. See id. at 493-94.
123.1d. at 496-97.
124. Id. at 497.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 498.
127. Id. at 499.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 493-94.
130. See Jordan, supra note 101, at 445 (noting that research into the costs and benefits of the hard
look doctrine reveals that agencies are "generally able to achieve their regulatory goals, usually with
no significant judicial interference"); Sunstein, supra note 101, at 537 (observing that aggressive
judicial review aids in producing agency rules "that have saved lives or otherwise accomplished
considerable good"); cf Seidenfeld, Deossification, supra note 89, at 523-24 (concluding that, while
the hard look doctrine does create uncertainty in agency rulemaking, a more deferential view would not
clear up this uncertainty).
131. Jordan, supra note 101, at 444.
[Vol. 58: 455
14
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 2
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss3/2
2007] ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
V. TAKING A HARD LOOK AT THE NEW COASTAL ISLAND REGULATIONS
The new coastal island regulations illustrate the need for aggressive judicial
review of administrative decisions in South Carolina. The regulations were the
product of notice-and-comment rulemaking 32 and an agency-created advisory
committee composed of interested parties representing a spectrum of interests.
133
In applying the hard look doctrine, the court should use a two-part analysis to
determine if a rule is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. First, the
court should question whether the agency gathered and considered all of the
relevant information necessary to make a reasoned decision. 34 Once satisfied
that an agency looked at all the relevant information, the court should then
assess how the agency used that information.'35 In performing this part of the
analysis, the court should consider whether the agency rule is reasonably
connected to the relevant facts and if the agency articulated a "'rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made.""1
36
To analyze South Carolina's new coastal island regulations, the court should
focus on the actions of the advisory committee. DHEC charged the committee
with drafting recommendations for access to coastal islands, 137 and the General
Assembly, with some revisions, approved the advisory committee's draft
regulations.'38 The advisory committee, therefore, conducted a majority of the
substantive rulemaking and was the body primarily responsible for researching
and analyzing relevant information. As a result, when conducting hard look
review, it is proper for the court to focus on the advisory committee's actions.
132. Notice-and-comment rulemaking occurs when an "agency publishes a proposed regulation
and receives public comments on the regulation, after which the regulation can take effect without the
necessity of a formal hearing on the record." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1358 (8th ed. 2004). This type
of rulemaking is "the most common procedure followed by an agency in issuing its substantive rules,"
Id. Regulations proposed by South Carolina agencies do not require a formal hearing but only public
notice and an opportunity for public comment. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 1-23-110 (2004). The advisory
committee provided concerned citizens with notice of upcoming meetings and an opportunity for public
comment. See, e.g., Minutes of Marsh Islands Advisory Committee Meeting (August 24, 2005)
[hereinafter August 24 Minutes] (on file with the OCRM-Charleston Office).
133. The six member committee was composed of one representative each from the South Carolina
Coastal Council, South Carolina Law Project, South Carolina Coastal Conservation League, Palmetto
Bluff Conservancy, legal profession, and coastal real estate development industry. Minutes of Marsh
Islands Advisory Committee Meeting 1 (July 13, 2005) [hereinafter July 13 Minutes] (on file with the
OCRM-Charleston office).
134. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (stating that, while the scope of review under an arbitrary and capricious standard is narrow, the
agency must still "examine the relevant data").
135. Id.
136. Id. (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
137. Minutes of Marsh Islands Advisory Committee Meeting (July 27, 2005) [hereinafter July 27
Minutes] (on filed with the OCRM-Charleston Office).
138. 30 S.C. Reg. 167, 167-73 (June 23, 2006).
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A. Whether the Advisory Committee Looked at All Relevant Information
Under the hard look doctrine, the court should first inquire as to whether the
advisory committee looked at all relevant information. Because the advisory
committee chose to effectuate the purpose of the regulations (to protect critical
areas from the adverse impacts of bridge construction" 9 ) by restricting eligibility
for a bridge construction permit based on an island's size and distance from the
mainland, examples of relevant information might include:
1) The adverse impact to critical areas caused by development of a
bridged island;
2) The change in amount of adverse impact caused by development of
critical areas based on the size of the island;
3) The change in amount of adverse impact caused by development of
the critical area based on the distance of the island from the
mainland;
4) The reduced adverse impact to the critical area for exempted
islands; 4 ' and
5) The increased adverse impact to the critical area caused by
development in prohibited areas.'4 '
These considerations represent a cursory sketch of the type of information that
would be relevant in creating regulations that restrict whether a bridge can be
built to an island based on the island's size and distance from uplands.
The advisory committee, however, failed to investigate many important
factors in crafting the new coastal island regulations. Instead, the committee
focused on the possibility of creating a permitting system based on the size of an
island and its distance from uplands.'42 At the advisory committee's initial
meeting on July 13, 2005, OCRM reported the number and sizes of all marsh
islands surrounded by critical areas.'43 Given that the committee focused on a
tiered size and distance system, it is not hard to conclude that the next logical
step for the committee would be to study the impacts of developing islands
based on their size and distance from the mainland. The committee did look at a
South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (SCDNR) report discussing the
139. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(1) (Supp. 2006).
140. Exempted islands are those that OCRM considers uplands for the purpose of bridging. S.C.
CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2)(f)(i)(b) (Supp. 2006).
141. Prohibited areas listed in S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2)(b) (Supp. 2006) may only be
bridged under the special exception in S.C. CODE ANN. REGS 30-12(N)(10) (Supp. 2006).
142. See July 13 Minutes supra note 133.
143. Id. at 2 (The OCRM representative "provided data on the number and size of marsh islands
in the critical area.").
[Vol. 58: 455
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negative impacts of coastal island development on critical areas.'" However, the
committee neither conducted nor utilized any study that specifically looked at
protecting islands by prohibiting bridging based on size and distance from
uplands; instead, the committee drew tiers based on how many islands would be
excluded from permit eligibility. 45 The committee, however, continued to focus
on size and distance limitations for bridge permitting. At the July 27, 2005
meeting, OCRM presented a matrix detailing all marsh islands' size and distance
from the mainland.'46 The committee used the matrix to develop a tiered system
based on the size of the island and its distance from the mainland.'47 This tiered
system excluded from permit eligibility islands that the advisory committee
considered too small for development based on their distance from the
mainland.48
The advisory committee's minutes do not indicate that the committee
discussed either alternatives to the tiered system or the impact of the tiered
system on tidelands. The only substantive discussion concerning the tiered
system recorded in the minutes involved checking the island size and distance
matrix to determine how many islands would be eligible for bridging based on
where the committee set the size and distance limitations. 4 9 The goal of the
advisory committee appeared to be ensuring the protection of wetlands by
restricting the number of islands eligible for a bridge permit.' Based on the
144. Id. (referring to MARINE RES. Div., S.C. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES., AN ECOLOGICAL
CHARACTERIZATION OF COASTAL HAMMOCK ISLANDS IN SOUTH CAROLINA (2004) [hereinafter
ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATION REPORT], http://www.csc.noaa.gov/id/DNRFinal_l _report-
December.pdf).
145. See July 13 Minutes, supra note 133 (requesting additional information concerning islands'
size and distance from the mainland); July 27 Minutes, supra note 137 (agreeing on size and distance
correlation and requesting additional matrices to assist in developing the tiers); Minutes of Marsh
Islands Advisory Committee Meeting (August 10, 2005) [hereinafter August 10 Minutes] (on file with
the OCRM-Charleston office) (applying new matrices to tiered system and adjusting size and distance
limitations); August 24 Minutes, supra note 132 (adding coastal islands to the matrix and adjusting
limitations accordingly). It is possible that, based on the SCDNR report, the committee determined that
any bridging in critical areas was unacceptable and drew the tiers solely to limit the number of islands
eligible to apply for a permit. While a conclusion that all development was unacceptable might allow
the committee to prohibit all bridging over critical areas, such a conclusion would not allow the
committee to draw arbitrary lines leaving just enough areas eligible to sufficiently placate developers.
If the committee determined that any bridging in a critical area is unacceptable, then exempting certain
islands based on arbitrary distinctions is inappropriate.
146. July 27 Minutes, supra note 137.
147. Id.
148. Id. The committee also received information about how Florida and Georgia handle private
access to marsh islands. Id.
149. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
150. The committee did recommend a possible exception for islands one acre or larger that fail
to qualify for a bridge permit under the tiered system. 30 S.C. Reg. 167, 177 (June 23, 2006). To
qualify, the party requesting the exception must present "clear and convincing evidence that granting
the bridge permit will serve an overriding public interest." Id. An application for an exception can meet
the test for an overriding public interest only where the construction of the bridge results in "mitigation
and diminished impacts to public trust resources compared with development that would likely occur
without the bridge." Id.
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committee's focus on the marsh island size and distance matrix rather than any
empirical data concerning the impact of building bridges to islands of certain
sizes and distances from the mainland, it is apparent that the advisory committee
did not use scientific data to establish the tiered system.
In addition, the committee failed to consider any scientific information in
establishing the prohibitions'51  and exceptions... contained in the new
regulations. The committee investigated neither the need for increased protection
nor the increased adverse impact of bridging in these areas relative to other
coastal areas. The committee recommended that prohibited areas be subject to
the same exception requirements as islands over one acre that are not eligible to
apply for a permit.'53 Similarly, the committee recommended that, for the
purposes of this regulation, OCRM consider certain islands as uplands, thus
excluding them from the new coastal island regulations.'54
The committee minutes, however, fail to provide a justification for why the
new coastal island regulations should not apply to these islands. It seems that the
committee failed to assess the impact to critical areas by excluding these islands
from the regulations. It is conspicuous that the excepted islands represent areas
where development activity is most prevalent 55 which raises the suspicion that
the prohibitions and exceptions were the result of a political compromise
between environmentalists and developers and not the result of reasoned
decisionmaking 56 By using such arbitrary distinctions, the committee evidently
failed to consider all relevant information."'
151. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2)(b) (Supp. 2006).
152. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 30-12(N)(2)(f)(i)(b) (Supp. 2006).
153. 30 S.C. Reg. 167, 174 (June 23, 2006).
154. Id. at 175.
155. The fact that the regulations treat the excepted islands as uplands is important because, when
determining the distance of the island from uplands, smaller marsh islands can base their distance from
these excepted islands rather than from true uplands. Thus, more islands are available for development
that, absent the exceptions, would not be eligible to apply for a permit.
156. The Ninth Circuit remanded a U.S. Department of Commerce decision in Midwater Trawlers
Co-Operative v. Department of Commerce regarding fish allocation for Indian tribes because the history
leading up to the decision indicated that the agency's decision "was a product of pure political
compromise, not reasoned scientific endeavor." 282 F.3d 710, 720-21 (9th Cir. 2002). In remanding
the decision, the court charged the Department of Commerce to "promulgate a new allocation consistent
with the law and based on the best available science, or to provide further justification for the current
allocation." Id. at 721.
157. It should be noted that the committee met five times over two months. See July 13 Minutes,
supra note 133; July 27 Minutes, supra note 137; August 10 Minutes, supra note 146; August 24
Minutes, supra note 132; Minutes of Marsh Island Advisory Committee Meeting (August 30,2005) (on
file at the OCRM-Charleston office) [hereinafter August 30 Minutes]. Given the short period of time
in which the committee created its recommendations, it is not surprising that the committee was unable
to gather all relevant information.
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B. How the Advisory Committee Used the Information It Gathered
As a second step under the hard look doctrine, courts must assess how the
agency used all the relevant information it gathered to arrive at its decision.'5 8
Under this analysis, the court looks to ascertain if the agency's determination is
the result of reasoned, rather than arbitrary, decision-making. The new coastal
island regulations would fail to meet this test. Again, the focus is on the tiered
system recommended by the committee. At the July 13, 2005 committee
meeting, SCDNR presented a report detailing the biological diversity of flora
and fauna on a representative sample of marsh islands.'59 Based on the findings
of the study, a representative from SCDNR concluded that "[i]slands should not
be exempted from protection based upon size" and that "[s]ize alone should not
be used to characterize the relative biological importance of marsh
hammocks."' 60 When the committee asked for SCDNR's recommendation, the
agency asserted that "islands should be considered on a case-by-case basis" and
that "an island ranking process" that took into account the environmental
impacts of bridge construction to a specific island "was feasible. ' ' 16 1 In addition,
during the public comment portion of the August 24, 2005 advisory committee
meeting, the Coastal Conservation League expressed concerns over the potential
environmental impacts of the tiered system.'62 The Coastal Conservation League
stated that "no reason exists to move forward with regulations unless these
regulations are an advance in the protection of the public trust resources" and
recommended that the regulations consider islands individually rather than in a
tiered system.'63 Based on the minutes of the committee meetings, it does not
appear the committee seriously entertained either recommendation and
continued to pursue the tiered system."6 Furthermore, no party testified before
the committee that distinctions based on island size and distance from the
mainland would serve to protect critical areas. Based on the information
considered by the committee, the advisory committee's creation of the tiered
system appears arbitrary and capricious because it failed to use all of the
relevant information to arrive at a reasoned decision.
Under a hard look review, a court should invalidate the new coastal island
regulations. In applying the hard look doctrine, the court must assess first,
whether the advisory committee gathered all relevant information and second,
158. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
159. ECOLOGICAL CHARACTERIZATION REPORT, supra note 144, at 98-99.
160. Id. at 100.
161. July 13 Minutes, supra note 133. SCDNR, however, did state that the department currently
lacked the manpower to undertake such a study. Id.
162. August 24 Minutes, supra note 132.
163. Id.
164. See July 13 Minutes, supra note 133 (continuing to create size and distance correlation but
not discussing SCDNR recommendation that the islands be considered on a case-by-case basis); August
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whether the advisory committee based its decision on those relevant facts. The
committee's failure to assess the impact of basing permit eligibility on an
island's size and distance from uplands indicates that it failed to gather all
relevant information.'65 Also, the committee pursued the tiered system despite
testimony that islands should be considered on a case-by-case basis.'66 A court
applying hard look review, therefore, should remand the regulations to allow
DHEC and OCRM to redraft the regulations after gathering and considering the
relevant information.
VI. CONCLUSION
South Carolina courts should take the opportunity presented by the new
coastal island regulations to adopt a hard look approach to evaluating agency
decision-making. Although agencies exercise powers delegated by the
legislature and the legislature approves regulations, at least in South Carolina,
agency determinations ultimately are not the product of an elected legislature
and should not be afforded the same amount of deference as legislative
enactments.
In assessing the new coastal island regulations, the benefits of the hard look
doctrine become apparent. By requiring the agency to establish that it both
looked at and considered all relevant information, the hard look doctrine would
ensure that the promulgated regulation was the result of reasoned, not arbitrary,
decision-making. The benefit of reasoned decision-making, based on a
comprehensive consideration of all relevant information, is a regulation that can
actually achieve its purpose. In this case, the result would be regulations
prohibiting bridging in situations where adverse environmental impacts to
critical areas would result while also allowing development in areas where the
impacts to critical areas would be minimized.
Furthermore, the check on OCRM preserves the system of checks and
balances so fundamental to separation of powers by establishing the judiciary's
role as a check and balance against the regulatory power of administrative
agencies. The court would enhance the perceived legality and legitimacy of the
regulation by ensuring it is not arbitrary. The current coastal island regulations
may leave some members of the public wondering why they will be ineligible
for a permit because their island is 1,501 feet from uplands while an island 1,499
feet from uplands is eligible. The regulations will seem to many as arbitrary and,
therefore, illegitimate or illegal. By applying the hard look doctrine, the public
will be reassured that the agency assessed all relevant factors, made its decision
accordingly, and promulgated a regulation that is a valid exercise in
administrative decision-making.
Finally, the court protects the interest of the public by engaging in
aggressive judicial review. The notice-and-comment method of rulemaking is
165. See supra Part V.A.
166. See supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
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susceptible to capture by well-organized and funded private interest groups. By
applying the hard look doctrine, the court would ensure that the agency has
weighed the impacts to all parties and rationally decided who should bear the
burdens of regulation or non-regulation. The benefit of heightened judicial
review in this context is that it assures that the committee considered the
interests of all interested parties and not just environmental groups and
developers.
In finding that the new coastal island regulations fail hard look review, the
appropriate remedy would be for the court to remand the case to allow DHEC
and OCRM either to provide sufficient scientific evidence supporting the
regulations or to redesign the regulations after gathering and assessing all
relevant factors.
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